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Abstract
The spent fuel dry cask should remain subcritical under normal, abnormal, and
accident conditions. The cask may become susceptible to criticality if it is misloaded
with assemblies that do not conform with the Certificate of Compliance (CoC).
Assessment of probability of criticality for a misloaded cask that subsequently ex-
periences an accident during the transportation process is also of interest. To avoid
misloading, the cask loading process involves several verification steps to make sure
that all of the loaded assemblies satisfy the CoC requirements. However, most of
the loading and verification steps are carried out by humans with finite probabil-
ities for errors, which need to be quantified. Quantification of the risk of having
a misloaded cask may reduce the conservatism in the cask designs and eliminate
unnecessary steps in the spent fuel handling and loading procedure.
In the first part of this study, the probability of misloading a cask with at least
one light water reactor, pressurized water reactor (PWR) and boiling water re-
actor (BWR), fuel assembly is quantified first using the event tree method. An
event tree and associated fault trees are developed for the cask loading procedures.
Probability distribution functions (PDFs) for all of the human errors are obtained
using the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk-Human Reliability Analysis (SPAR-H)
human reliability analysis method. Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on In-
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tegrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) software is used to quantify the event
tree and to calculate the probability of misload. The probability of misloading a
cask with at least one fuel assembly is first determined for PWR fuel and it was
found to be 5.56E-06, which agrees well with that reported in the literature. The
probability of misloading a cask with at least one fuel assembly for the BWR fuel
is found to be 2.95E-05. The impact of the cask capacity on the probability of
misload is quantified and discussed. The Fussell-Vesely (FV) importance measure
is performed to determine the tasks that contribute the most to having a misloaded
cask. The effects of the available time to perform a task and the stress level of the
operator on the final probability of misload are studied. The available time and
stress are found to have a significant impact on the final misload probability.
Based on the neutronic calculations, the cask needs to be misloaded with more
than one fuel assemblies in order to become susceptible to criticality. In the second
part of this study, an event tree is built to predict the multiple misloads scenarios.
Six multiple misloads scenarios are identified from the tree. The probabilities of
the six scenarios and the total probability are calculated for casks for both reactor
types. The probabilities calculated using this method are found to be 6.73E-07 and
7.55E-06 for PWR and BWR fuels, respectively. In addition, the probability of
multiple misloads is calculated as a function of the cask capacity.
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Nuclear waste from nuclear reactors continues to increase. High-level waste comes
from the used nuclear fuel (UNF) that is discharged from the nuclear reactor cores
at the end of each cycle. The UNF inventory increases by 2,000-2,300 metric tons
per year. By the end of June 2013, the estimated amount of UNF was 69,681
metric tons which correspond to 241,468 UNF assemblies, out of which 57% are
BWR assemblies and the remaining are PWR assemblies[1]. The UNF is usually
kept in the spent fuel pool (SFP) inside the nuclear reactor building. Due to
unavailability of a long-term waste repository, as the pools get filled up, old UNF
is being transferred from pools to dry spent fuel casks, for eventual transportation
to permanent future repository or recycling. Prior to transportation, the filled
dry spent fuel casks are stored in the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
(ISFSI) on-site.
According to [2], more than 2,000 dry storage canisters currently store the used
fuel assemblies using sixteen unique storage cask designs. This represents more than
83,000 used fuel assemblies. Three major canister designs store more than 75% of
the total stored spent fuel. There are 750 canisters of HI-STORM 100 design that
store 38,428 fuel assemblies, 606 of Standardized NUHOMS type that store 24,285
fuel assemblies, and 244 of NAC-UMS design with 5,850 assemblies. Among these
1
83,000 fuel assemblies, approximately (52%) are BWR spent fuel assemblies and
( 48%) are PWR assemblies[3]. The HI-STORM 100 design will be considered in
this study because it is the most widely used system and it can be used to store
both BWR and PWR assemblies. Two major types of the HI-STORM canisters are
considered: MPC-32 and MPC-68 [4]. The MPC-32 canister is being used to store
PWR assemblies. There are approximately 315 canisters of this type which store
10,080 assemblies. The MPC-68 is being used to store BWR assemblies. There
are currently 402 canisters with 27,336 assemblies of this type. The MPC-32 can
store up to 32 PWR assemblies while the MPC-68 is capable of storing 68 BWR
assemblies.
One of the main considerations of dry cask design is to maintain the cask as
subcritical under normal, abnormal, and accident conditions. They should also
remain subcritical during transportation, including in transportation-related acci-
dents. This condition can be satisfied by loading the dry cask with fuel assemblies
that meet the Certificate of Compliance (CoC) requirements for that cask. The
cask may become susceptible to criticality if it is misloaded, and experiences an ac-
cident during transportation. This important scenario must be studied to prevent
a criticality accident. Assessment of risk associated with transportation of dry cask
then involves assessment of risk of misloading a cask, risk of accident during the
transportation process, and risk of criticality following the accident. Risk associ-
ated with the first of these is the subject of this work. A cask is termed misloaded
when the assemblies in the cask are different from what is recorded in the database.
A cask is also considered misloaded if the configuration of the assemblies inside
the cask is different from what is recorded in the database or specified in the CoC.
Errors made during handling, storing, loading and database entry can lead to mis-
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loaded casks. For example, misloading can happen by placing a spent fuel assembly
having incorrect burnup value, cooling time, or initial enrichment inside the cask,
misplacing an assembly into an incorrect cell location inside the cask, or when two
or more assemblies positions are swapped during the loading process.
According to Knudsen [5], 327 misload events have occurred between the period
of 1985 and 1999 out of 1,199,000 fuel movements. These events represent misload
events that have been caught before shipment of the casks. More recent misload
events are identified by these references [6, 7, 8, 9]. As an example of these events,
in the period between 2007-2009 at the North Anna power planet, 7 casks were
misloaded with 13 fuel assemblies. Also, in 2008 at Grand Gulf power planet,
4 casks were misloaded with 34 fuel assemblies exceeding the burnup and/or the
allowed decay heat. Moreover, in 2011 at North Anna and Surry power planet, 17
fuel assemblies exceeding the decay heat limit were misloaded into casks [10].
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.1 provides background on risk
definition and PRA techniques. Section 1.2 provides a review of existing studies on
the cask misload probability. The objectives of the thesis is presented in Section
1.3. In Section 1.4, thesis outline is explained.
1.1 Risk Definition
Risk can be described qualitatively and quantitatively. The qualitative aspect
can be defined as the ”possibility of loss with uncertainty” [11]. This risk or loss
can be any type of undesired outcomes such as financial risk. Risk is a subjective
(directional) concept and can vary from one observer to another based on their level
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of knowledge. For instance, if you asked two people if it is risky to drive at that
time, when one knows that a snow storm is coming and the other does not, they
indeed will have different answers. Quantitatively speaking, risk can be defined by
answering the following three questions [11]:
• What can go wrong?
• What is the probability of that?
• What are the consequences?
Based on the answers to the previous questions, a list of the risk triplets can be
obtained in the following form:
R = {Si, Pi, Ci} (1.1)
where Si is the answer to the first question (scenario leading to undesired outcome),
Pi is the answer to the second question (frequency of that scenario) and Ci is the
answer to the third question (consequences or the level of damage).
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is widely used for assessing risk of com-
plex technological systems, such as nuclear power plants and aerospace missions
[12]. PRA uses a combination of systematic and probabilistic modeling techniques,
e.g., event trees and fault tress, to analyze the risk scenarios and quantify the sys-
tem risk. The event trees (ETs) and fault trees (FTs) are the standard approach
to quantify the risk. The event tree method is an inductive approach to model
chronological events starting from an initiating event to the end of the sequence
[13]. The event trees are very useful for complex systems where sequence of events
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are performed to archive a desirable outcome. The event trees components are the
top events, initiating event, branches, and end states. The initiating event repre-
sents the triggering event or the starting point. Each of the chronological event
is represented by top events in the tree. Each event has branches of success and
failure. The end states represent a combination of occurrence of events that lead
to specific outcome. The failure probability of the top events can be calculated
directly from the available data or using the fault trees if there is no enough data
available. The fault tree is a deductive process where all of the possible ways that
lead to the failure of a system or a process are modeled and linked together with
several logical gates (”AND” and ”OR”). If the top event is related to human,
one of the human reliability analysis (HRA) methods can be used to estimate the
probability of failure. The HRA methods are explained in Chapter 2 of this thesis.
1.2 Previous Work
A report by Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)[8] studied the risk of a
PWR cask becoming critical during transportation. In this report, the processes
of refueling, organization of assemblies within the spent fuel pool and loading the
fuel assemblies into the cask were described. A description of each human task was
provided in the report. The sequences that may lead to a critical accident were
described and an event tree was developed to find the risk of that accident. The
probability of misloading a cask with PWR fuel was calculated using the event
tree methodology. Also, the probability of having an accident that could lead to
criticality was calculated. The ”Techniques for the Human Error Rate Prediction”
(THERP) was used to estimate the human error probabilities (HEPs) for tasks
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performed by humans. The report showed that the calculated risk of having a
misloaded cask and having a critical accident are negligibly small. However, the
uncertainty in the result was not calculated in the report. The study was limited
to the PWR designs with 32 fuel assembly cask.
A study carried out by Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)[6] reported the
probability of misloading in PWR calculated using two distinct methods: (1) the
event tree approach in which the HEPs were obtained using THERP, and (2) di-
rect calculation from the historical data of misloading events. The probability of
multiple misloads was calculated from the single misload probability by assuming
that the misloads are independent. The uncertainty in the probability value was
calculated for both methods. However, the modeled event tree was very simple
compared to the EPRI model. The probability calculations in this study were also
limited to the PWR designs.
In the study by Brewer et al. [7], different human actions of spent fuel handling
processes were studied. ”A Technique for Human Event Analysis” (ATHEANA)
HRA method was used to quantify the potential errors in human actions. In this
report, different scenarios describing the potential errors in handling the spent fuel
assemblies were developed for both BWR and PWR. The focus was on the misload
and cask drop scenarios. The processes of refueling and loading assemblies were
described briefly for a generic reactor type and it can be applied to both PWRs
and BWRs. The main sources of information in this report were from:
• Interviewing the workers and managers in the reactor.
• Two reports developed by NRC and EPRI [14, 15].
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• The safety evaluation report of HI-STORM 100 cask.
The risk of waste package misload is quantified by Knudson [16]. In this study,
both PWR and BWR waste packages are considered. The probability of misloading
the waste package with at least one fuel assembly is calculated using the event tree.
Two event trees were constructed for both PWR and BWR waste packages. THERP
is used to quantify the human error probability for all human tasks. The multiple
misloads events are excluded from the analysis by calculating the multiple error
probability. The calculation was carried out by assuming the misload events are
independent. In addition, the SPAR-H manual [17] took the cask loading process
as an example in Appendix E of the manual. The study considered the cask loading
process as a single task instead of dividing the whole process into multiple tasks.
Other studies focused on different aspects of the risk associated with the spent
fuel casks. In a study by Brewer et al. [18], the risk of dropping the spent fuel cask
is quantified. The ATHEANA HRA method was used to quantify the human error
probabilities. Different dropping scenarios are predicted in this study. The risk
during transportation is also quantified in the two studies by Dykes and Machiels
[8] and Sprung et al. [19]. The cask response to the collision fires is calculated using
the finite element method. Moreover, In a report by [20], different safety issues
related to the cask handling and storing are discussed. The accepted approaches
for removing the residual heat and maintaining the fuel subcritical inside the cask
and other issues are provided in the report.
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1.3 Objectives
Most studies on the spent fuel handling have focused mainly on the PWR fuel
because it is the most used reactor type in the world. However, the number of
BWR spent fuel assemblies stored in the SFP in the nuclear reactors is greater than
PWR assemblies. Also, the dry cask can be loaded with more BWR assemblies than
PWR assemblies, which increases the chance of error during the loading process.
Thus, the risk in handling BWR fuel has the same importance as the PWR and
it should be studied separately. Therefore, this research focuses on the risk of
misloading the spent fuel casks in both reactors. In addition, the studies by EPRI
and NRC [8, 6] used THERP, which is a first generation HRA method, to estimate
the human error probabilities. However, this research uses a more advanced HRA
quantification technique, SPAR-H, to provide more accurate results and highlights
different aspects during the analysis. Also, the multiple misloads risk was not
quantified by any of the three studies [6, 7]. However in the NRC study [8], the
multiple misloads probability was calculated by assuming that the multiple misloads
events are independent. In this thesis, A method to quantify the risk of multiple
misload is provided where the dependency between the misload events and the
dependency between human actions are considered. Quantification of the risk of
having a misloaded cask with one or multiple fuel assemblies may prevent the
misloading scenarios, reduce the conservatism in the cask designs and eliminate
unnecessary steps in the spent fuel handling and loading procedure.
The focus of this work is to estimate the risk of misloading single and multi-
ple fuel assemblies inside the spent fuel cask by quantitatively analyzing the cask
loading procedures for the PWR and BWR. A probabilistic model is developed to
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estimate the risk associated with the cask loading procedures for the two types of
fuel. The event tree methodology is used to model the loading procedures. The hu-
man error probabilities (HEPs) are quantified using the human reliability analysis
(HRA) method called Standardized Plant Analysis Risk-Human Reliability Analysis
(SPAR-H). The probability distribution functions (PDFs) of all of the human failure
events are obtained. In addition, the effect of the number of the loaded assemblies
on the final probability of misload is investigated. The event tree is constructed and
quantified using the Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability
Evaluations (SAPHIRE) software. The uncertainty in the result and the impor-
tance analysis of the tasks are also performed using SAPHIRE. Results obtained
using SPAR-H and THERP are compared.
Figure 1.1 shows the thesis flowchart to achieve the objectives. The first step is to
collect data and information about the spent fuel loading process. This information
is obtained from the available reports, regulations, and interviewing experts in the
field of spent fuel loading. Then, the description of all human actions involving in
the loading process is used to estimate the human error probabilities using one of the
human reliability analysis (HRA) methods. The outputs of the HRA are probability
distribution functions (PDFs) for all human failure probabilities. An event tree
is constructed to model the cask loading process. The fault trees are used to
decompose the complex tasks modeled in the event tree into smaller subtasks. The
misload scenarios are obtained directly from the event tree. SAPHIRE software is
used to quantify the event tree and calculate the misload probability. The output of
the software is the final misload probability with its uncertainty. Finally, sensitivity
analysis is carried out to study the influences of key input parameters in the HRA
quantification and different settings of the cask loading process.
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1.4 Thesis Outline
The outline of this thesis is as follows. The next chapter is an overview of the
HRA methods. Chapter 3 describes the cask loading process and the human tasks
associated with the process. Also, the event tree and the associated fault tree model
are described in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, the results of SPAR-H analysis and the
final single misload probability of the event tree quantification are presented. The
risk of multiple misloads are quantified and reported in Chapter 5. Chapter 6



















Review of Existing Human
Reliability Analysis (HRA)
Methods
Human actions play a major role in the process of loading the spent fuel assem-
blies into the cask. To accurately quantify the risk of cask misloading, potential
human errors during the process of loading should be identified. Different human
reliability analysis (HRA) models can be used to estimate the human error proba-
bilities (HEPs). These HRA models can be classified as the following [21, 22, 23]:
• First generation methods
• Second generation methods
• Third generation methods
2.1 First Generation Methods
The first-generation methods were developed to quantify the human error prob-
abilities. In these methods, the human task can be divided into subtasks where
a nominal HEP is assigned to each of these subtasks. Then, the nominal HEP is
modified based on different modifying factors such as stress level, available time,
equipment design, etc. The main limitation of the first generation method is that
more attention is paid to the quantitative evaluation of the probability in terms of
success/failure of the action than to the causes of the human behavior. Also, the
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impacts of the context, environment, organization factor, and errors of commission
are not considered [21, 23]. In spite of these limitations, the first generation meth-
ods are widely used in the nuclear industry because of their simplicity. The main
first generation methods, THERP, ASEP, HEART, and SLIM-MAUD are discussed
below.
2.1.1 Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction
(THERP)
THERP is considered a first generation method which was developed by Swain
and Guttmann [24][25]. This method has been widely used in nuclear power plants
(NPPs) applications for several decades. The Handbook of Human Reliability Anal-
ysis with Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant Applications [24] was published in 1983.
In this handbook, a large database for different human error probabilities (HEPs)
is tabulated. These tables can be used to find the basic human error probability
(BHEP) for different human tasks. The BHEP can be modified by considering the
effects of different performance shaping factors (PSFs) and the levels of the depen-
dency which can be chosen from other tables. The lognormal distribution is used to
model the uncertainty of the HEPs. The steps to quantify the final HEP for each
human task are:
1. Decomposition of each task into subtasks (elements).
2. Assignment of nominal HEPs to each of those subtasks from the provided
tables. The probability values are obtained from the tables in chapter 20
from the handbook. These tables can be divided into 7 main categories as:
• Screening (Tables 20-1 and 20-2)
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• Diagnosis (Tables 20-3 and 20-4)
• Error of omission (Tables 20-5 through 20-8)
• Error of commission (Tables 20-9 through 20-14)
• PSFs and dependence (Tables 20-15 through 20-19)
• Uncertainty bound (Tables 20-20 and 20-21)
• Recovery factors (Tables 20-20 through 20-27)
The description of the task in the tables should match the description defined
by the analyst. Two HEPs can be used for the tasks that are not listed
in the tables (1E-3 for a general error of omission or commission, and 1E-3
for abnormal event for which the HEP of the task is negligible). Lognormal
distributions are used for all of the BHEPs where the median and the error
factor (EF) are tabulated.
3. Modifying the nominal HEPs based on the effects of chosen PSFs. All of
the tabulated HEPs are nominal values. In order to obtain the HEPs for a
specific plant, the effects of PSFs should be taken into the account to adjust
the probability for the deviation from the nominal conditions. PSFs effects
such as stress level and experience levels can be found in Table 20-16.
4. Determination of the level of the dependency of each element. The depen-
dency level between the tasks can be divided into five levels[24] as shown in
Table. 2.1
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Table 2.1: Dependency Level (FN is the failure probability of task N)
Level of dependency Failure equation Pr(FN |FN−1)
Zero Dependency (ZD) Pr(FN |FN−1, ZD) = FN
Low Dependency (LD) Pr(FN |FN−1, LD) = 1+19FN20
Medium Dependency (MD) Pr(FN |FN−1,MD) = 1+6FN7
High Dependency (HD) Pr(FN |FN−1, HD) = 1+FN2
Complete Dependency (CD) Pr(FN |FN−1, CD) = 1.0
5. Development of the HRA event tree for each of the tasks considering the effect
of the recovery actions.
6. Quantification of the final HEP for the task.
2.1.2 Accident Sequence Evaluation Program (ASEP)
One of the main limitations of THERP is that it is time consuming and resource
intensive. Because of that, NRC looked for a simplified method that would provide
a sufficiently accurate estimate for HEPs and response time for tasks. To satisfy
these requirements, ASEP was developed solely for nuclear applications based on
the THERP handbook method[26].
The ASEP is divided into two main procedures. First, pre-accident tasks which
are the tasks that if performed incorrectly could result in the unavailability of cer-
tain safety system or component that could affect the response to an accident.
Second, post-accident tasks which are tasks that are performed to recover the sys-
tem during the abnormal conditions. These two procedures are further divided
into procedures for screening HRA and nominal HRAs. The screening analysis
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aims to estimate the HEPs, response time, dependency level, and other human
performance characteristics in a conservative way. The nominal HRA estimates
the HEPs based on HRA team judgments to get more realistic HEPs which are
also conservative. Therefore, pre-accident screening HRA, post-accident screening
HRA, pre-accident nominal HRA, and post-accident nominal HRA are the four
sub-procedures of ASEP [21, 26, 27].
Compared to THERP, ASEP is considered a shortened version of THERP that
requires less training than THERP. Also, ASEP can be applied to the task level
or the subtask level based on the available information about the task. In general,
ASEP is mainly used for tasks that do not require a detailed analysis when it
is not necessary to break the human task into multiple subtasks. On the other
hand, THERP is applied to the tasks that require a detailed analysis using the
HRA event trees or fault trees[21]. However, both ASEP and HEART paid more
attention to the quantitative calculation of the probability. In this research, the
qualitative part is as important as the quantitative evaluation. In the cask misload
scenarios, the same task can be repeated for several fuel assemblies (typically 10-
100 fuel assemblies); hence, the treatment of task dependency is critical. In HRA,
the task dependency is typically handled by the combination of (i) consideration
of the underlying PSFs and (ii) the dependency condition table. With respect
to the dependency treatment, the first-generation HRA has less resolution than
more advanced HRA methods (as reviewed in Sections 2.2 and 2.3); therefore, this
research does not select the first-generation HRA methods reviewed above (THERP
and ASEP).
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2.1.3 Success Likelihood Index Methodology-
Multi-Attribute Utility Decomposition
(SLIM-MAUD)
SLIM is a method that uses the expert’s judgments to identify the factors that affect
the human performance in NPPs. SLIM was implemented through a computer
program called MAUD. That’s why it is called SLIM-MAUD[28].
In this method, a group of four or more experts who have experience with the
task is chosen. The group should have at least one of each of the following:
• Expert with design and operations of the specific type of NPP
• Expert with probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)
• Expert with human factors
The steps to estimate the HEP for specific task can be summarized as[29, 30]:
1. Specifying the performance shaping factors (PSFs)
2. Weighting the PSFs ranging from 0 to 100
3. Scoring (rating) the PSFs ranging from 0 to 100




(PSF )i × wi (2.1)
where wi is the assigned weight for the i
th PSF .
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5. Converting the SLI to HEP using the following formula:
HEP = 1− 10a×SLI+b (2.2)
Where a and b need to be determined using two reference tasks whose HEPs
and SLIs are known.
This method uses the experts judgments to identify the factors that affect the
human performance. It is resource intensive and requires panel of experts comprise
2 operators, 1 reliability analyst and 1 human factors specialist. Therefore, it is
difficult to be applied for this research.
2.1.4 Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique
(HEART)
HEART was developed by Williams [31]. In this method, the appropriate task
description from a list of 9 Generic Task Types (GGTs) is identified for the task
at hand. Then, the Error-Producing Conditions (EPCs) are identified from a list
of 38 EPCs where a weight for each EPC is assigned ranging from 0 (best) to 1
(worst). The HEP is calculated using the following equation:
HEP = BHEP +
n∏
i=0
[(EPCi − 1)× wi + 1] (2.3)
where BHEP is the basic HEP, and wi is the assigned weight for the i
th EPC.
According to Bell and Holroyd [21], HEART needs detailed description of each
task to differentiate between the generic tasks and the associated EPCs. The avail-
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able details of the human tasks in the cask loading process is not sufficient to use
HEART. Therefore, other method that does not require detail description needs to
be used in this research.
2.2 Second-Generation Methods
The main shortcoming of the first-generation methods is that more attention
is paid to quantitative assessment of the HEPs. However, the causes/reasons of
the human error are important to have a better understanding of the factors that
increase the failure probability and interdependence of PSFs. For that reason,
more conceptual methods are developed as a second-generation of HRA. These
methods put more focus on the cognitive aspects and the contextual factors leading
to human error than specific types of tasks and their frequency.[23]. Also, the
derivation of the PSFs of the second generation methods is based on the cognitive
impacts on the operators instead of environmental impacts prominent in the first-
generation[23, 32]. The most commonly used second-generation methods in nuclear
sector are Standardized Plant Analysis Risk-Human Reliability Analysis (SPAR-H),
Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM), and A Technique for
Human Event Analysis (ATHEANA).
2.2.1 SPAR-H
SPAR-H is the updated version of the Accident Sequence Precursor Standardized
Plant Analysis Risk Model (ASP/SPAR) which was developed by NRC and Idaho
National Laboratory (INL) [17]. SPAR-H was derived from THERP to provide a
simple approach to estimate the (HEPs)[33]. The steps to calculate the HEPs are
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1. Categorizing the human task as diagnosis task, action task, or both.
In SPAR-H, the action and diagnosis are the only two general task cate-
gories. The action task can be defined as doing one or more activities indicated
by diagnosis, operating rules, or written procedures. Starting pumps and per-
forming line ups are examples of the action tasks. The generic error rate of
1E-3 is assigned to the action task. The tasks that require knowledge and
experience to understand a certain condition and determine the most appro-
priate actions can be considered as diagnosis tasks. The generic error rate for
this type of tasks is 1E-2. Most of the human tasks are a combination of both
action and diagnosis.
2. Rating the Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs).
Eight PSFs are used in SPAR-H to adjust the Nominal Human Error Prob-
ability (NHEP) obtained from the first step. The PSFs can have negative or
positive effects on the probability of failure. The eight PSFs are: ”Available
Time”, ”Stress”, ”Complexity”, ”Experience/Training”, ”Procedures”, ”Er-
gonomics/ Human-Machine Interface (HMI)”, ”Fitness for Duty”, and ”Work
Process”.
3. Modifying the nominal human error probability.
The nominal human error probability is modified based on the PSFs using





where PSFi is the multiplier for the assigned performance shaping factor i,
and NHEP = 0.01 for the diagnosis task and NHEP = 0.001 for the action












4. Combining the diagnosis and action into a single human failure event.
Carry out steps 1-3 for diagnosis and action tasks, separately. The final
mean value of the probability (HEPD+A) is the sum of both HEPs. Eq. (2.6)
should be applied if the sum of both probabilities exceeds 1.0 [33]
HEPD+A = HEPD +HEPA − [HEPD ×HEPA] (2.6)
where HEPD and HEPA are the human error probability for the diagnosis
and action tasks, respectively.
5. Assigning a dependency level to modify the HEP calculated above.
Five levels of dependency can be used in SPAR-H that are also derived from
THERP[33]. The five levels and the corresponding equations to update the
HEP are similar to those in THERP which are shown in Table. 2.1.
The contributory factors that determine the level of the dependency are:
(1) same crew or not, (2) same location or not, (3) existence of additional
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cues or not, and (4) the time between the two tasks. A combination of these
factors determines the level of dependency.
6. Employing a beta distribution to account for the uncertainty.
Reference [17] provides a worksheet to determine the beta distribution pa-
rameters.
It is recommended to use the SPAR-H worksheet that is provided in Ref. [17].
There are two separate worksheets; one for Low Power/Shutdown (LP/SD) and the
other for at power condition. The LD/SD SPAR-H worksheet is shown in Appendix
A. In this work, the LD/SD was used for all of the human tasks.
2.2.2 CREAM
CREAM is a second generation method that was developed by Hollnagel [34] in
1998. It has two versions; basic and extended. The basic version can be used as
a screening tool. CREAM is a bidirectional process which can be applied in ret-
rospective and prospective analysis[27, 34]. The prospective analysis identifies the
potential human errors while the retrospective analysis calculates the probability
of an error. Four basic control modes are used to include the concept of cognition.
The control modes are[34]:
• Scrambled control: The choice of the action is haphazard. This situation
happens when there is no time to think or in the unfamiliar situations.
• Opportunistic control: The next action is highly dependent on the current
situation, which could still be not very clear.
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• Tactical control: The action is performed based on planned procedure. How-
ever, some deviations are possible.
• Strategic control: The operator has plenty of time to perform an action, taking
higher level goals into account.
Table 2.2: Reliability intervals of the control modes
Control Mode Reliability interval
Scrambled 0.1 <p <1.0
Opportunistic 0.01 <p <0.5
Tactical 0.001 <p <0.1
Strategic 0.00005 <p <0.01
Each one of these control modes has a range of reliability. Table 2.2 shows
the reliability interval for the four control modes. The probability intervals of the
control modes provide a rough idea about the probability of failure. There are nine
common performance conditions (CPCs) that can be used to predict the HEP. These
nine CPCs are shown in Table 2.3. These CPCs can be then used to calculate the
HEPs. Different methods are available to calculate the HEP from the nine CPCs.
A simplified method by He et al. [35] is one of these methods that can be used
to find the final human error. However, its application is limited to few research
studies compared to THERP or SPAR-H [21]. Therefore, this research does not
consider CREAM for an assessment of the cask misload risk.
2.2.3 ATHEANA
ATHEANA is a second-generation method that was developed for NRC [36].
Both quantitative and qualitative HRA results can be obtained by ATHEANA. It
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Table 2.3: CPCs description and associated level
CPC Level
1. Adequacy of organization Deficient, Inefficient, Efficient, Very Efficient
2. Working conditions Incompatible, Compatible, Advantageous
3. Adequacy of man machine
interface and support
Inappropriate, Tolerable, Adequate, Supportive
4. Availability of procedures/plans Inappropriate, Acceptable, Appropriate
5. Number of simultaneous goals
More than actual capacity, Matching current




7. Time of day Night, Day
8. Adequacy of training and
experience
Inadequate, Adequate with limited experience,
Adequate with high
experience
9. Crew collaboration quality
Deficient, Inefficient,
Efficient, Very Efficient
also can be used for prospective and retrospective analysis[21, 22, 37]. There are
error-forcing contexts (EFCs) that can be used to calculate the HEPs. EFCs can
be defined as a combination of PSFs and any other factors that could affect the
human performance. Four related search schemes are used to determine the EPCs.
There are 10 main steps to find the HEPs. For more information, see Refs. [36]
and [37].
ATHEANA is very complex method that depends heavily on subject matter
experts. Its quantification method is weak compared to other second generation
methods such as SPAR-H [21]. Since the quantification part is as important as the
qualitative part in this research, this thesis does not consider ATHEANA for an




In the simulation-based HRA, virtual scenarios, virtual environments, and vir-
tual humans are used to simulate the human responses in actual scenarios and
environments[38]. The main difference between the simulation-based HRA and the
first and second generations methods is that it is a dynamic modeling system. The
probability of human errors is calculated using a frequentist approach, where the
human behaviors are modeled using Monte Carlo method. However, the use of
third-generation HRA methods has been limited to a few academic research stud-
ies. Therefore, this research does not consider the third-generation HRA methods
for an assessment of the cask misload risk. For additional information about this
generation, please see Ref. [38].
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Chapter 3
Cask Loading Process Model
The description of cask loading procedures and the event tree model are presented
in this chapter.
3.1 Loading Process
The description of the dry cask loading procedure was obtained from the following
sources:
1. Criticality Risks During Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel (EPRI)[8].
2. Preliminary, Qualitative Human Reliability Analysis For Spent Fuel Handling
(NRC)[7].
3. Estimating the probability of misload in a spent fuel cask (NRC)[6].
In these reports, the loading procedures were mainly described for the PWR fuel.
In this thesis, the same procedures were assumed for both reactor types (PWR
and BWR) and the only difference is the number of spent fuel assemblies that
will be loaded into the cask. This assumption is made based on the information
obtained by interviewing a subject matter expert in the field of spent fuel loading
in BWR. During the interview, all the human tasks in the BWR are compared
with the tasks described in the literature for PWR and found to be the same.
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Also, the factors that could affect the human performance in BWR are identified
and compared with those for PWR. Therefore, no significant differences that could
affect the loading process are found between both reactors. Meanwhile, it should be
acknowledged that minor differences that were not captured by the EPRI and NRC
reports (mentioned above) and the interview with the subject matter expert may
exist between the cask loading process of BWRs and that of PWRs. For instance,
those EPRI and NRC reports provide no information about how the fuel assemblys
ID is written and what is the number of digits of this ID in the BWR and PWR.
The number of digits may increase the failure probability of some human tasks.
Additionally, the time required to complete the cask loading campaign may affect
the probability of misload. If the time required to complete the campaign is the
same in both reactors, the time spent to load one fuel assembly in BWR would
be smaller. Thus, the failure probability may be increased for BWR fuel. In this
research, the influences of those minor differences between BWRs and PWRs are
not explicitly considered. This research recommends that, when the HRA method
developed in this research is applied to a specific type of plant, all potential factors
that can influence the human performance in the cask loading process should be
identified and carefully evaluated on a plant-specific basis.
The dry cask loading procedure is summarized in Fig. 3.1. There are six main
tasks. The process starts by generating the Fuel Loading Pattern Form (FLPF). It
is generated by the fuel management engineer and the fuel handling engineer. This
task can be divided into four sub-tasks. First, a list of all the spent fuel assemblies
that satisfy the required burnup, initial enrichment, cooling period, and decay heat
load is prepared. Error from this task can be ignored since the computer generates
the list of all the candidate assemblies based on the CoC of the cask. The second
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sub-task is performed by the fuel management engineer where he/she selects from
the list the assemblies that will be loaded into the cask. The assemblies are selected
to meet safety requirements associated with current and future configurations of
the SFP and ISFSI. The third sub-task is to generate the FLPF by filling the form
with the data of each assembly. This can be done manually by copying the serial
number of the assemblies and pasting it in the FLPF or it can be performed by
the computer automatically. The error from this task cannot be ignored if it is
performed manually. Finally, The FLPF is independently reviewed by a second
worker by verifying the serial number and the burnup of each assembly against the
database. Creating the FLPF is one of the most important tasks in the loading
process since any error in creating it cannot be appealed until the last revision prior
to shipment. The reason is that all the subsequent steps, except the last verification,
assume that the FLPF is created correctly and has no errors.
The second main task is to generate the Fuel Movement Sequence Data Sheet
(FMSDS). It is generated through three steps. The first step is to find the location
inside the SFP of each fuel assembly specified in the FLPF and assigning a location
inside the cask to it. The refueling engineer is responsible for performing this task.
The layout of both the cask and the SFP is printed on the computer screen where
the refueling engineer selects the assembly's location inside the pool and drags it to
its location in the cask based on the FLPF. The main concern here is choosing an
incorrect assembly from the SFP and/or assigning an incorrect location in a cask to
it. After repeating this task for all the assemblies, the refueling engineer prints out
the completed FMSDS. The second step, which is also carried out by the refueling
engineer, is to verify the printed FMSDS against the FLPF. The third step is also
a verification step where the fuel service supervisor verifies the completed FMSDS
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against the FLPF. The supervisor compares the serial number of each assembly
between both documents and signs it if there are no errors.
The third main task is to transfer the fuel assemblies from the SFP to the dry
cask. This task can be divided into four subtasks. The first subtask is to verify that
all of the fuel assemblies locations inside the SPF have the same serial numbers as in
the database. This task is performed jointly by the refueling engineer and a nuclear
oversight inspector using an underwater camera. Both verify the coordinates of
the bridge and trolley as well as the serial number of the assembly using a three-
way communication. In the three-way verification, the first individual reads the
coordinates of the bridge and trolley. The second verifies that the coordinates are
the same as stated by the first person. Then, the first confirms that the coordinates
are correct. The second subtask is to move the fuel assembly from the spent fuel
pool to its location in the dry cask. The third subtask is to verify the cell location
in the cask using the same three-way communication before loading the assembly.
The fourth subtask is to load the fuel assembly into the cask.
The fourth main task is to verify that the serial number and the cell location of
each loaded assembly are the same as in the FMSDS using an underwater camera.
This task is carried out jointly by the refueling engineer and a representative from
the nuclear oversight and regulatory affairs using the same three-way communica-
tions described previously. In this task, an underwater camera is inserted into the
cask and focuses on the location of the cell and the serial number of the loaded
assembly. The camera records this process and the video is sent to a third party
for verification.
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The fifth main task is the independent verification using the video recordings. In
this task, a third party verifies the serial number of the loaded assemblies against
the original FLPF. Once the verification is completed, the verification form is signed
and sent to the site. The cask is then sent to ISFI for long-term storage. In the
last main task, the burnup records in the database are verified against the serial
numbers specified by the FLPF. In this step, any errors made in generating the
FLPF can be appealed. This task usually is carried out prior to the shipment.




























Because the loading process depends on chronological operations, the event tree
is the most appropriate method to estimate the risk. The event tree method is an
inductive approach to model chronological events starting from an initiating event
to the end of the sequence. The initiating event represents the triggering event or
the starting point. Each of the chronological event is represented by top events in
the tree. The top events can be modeled using the fault tree methodology to add
additional details in the analysis. The fault tree is a deductive process where all of
the possible ways that lead to the failure of a system or a process are modeled and
linked together with several logical gates. The combination of the event tree and
fault trees was used previously by [6] to model the cask loading process. When the
HRA scenarios need both AND and OR logic, the combination of event tree and
fault tree generates a simpler model structure than that only based on an event tree
model. It is simpler to model a set of subtasks that are connected with multiple
”AND” and ”OR” logic using the fault trees.
Figure 3.2 shows the event tree of the cask loading process. The initiating event
is the beginning of the cask loading campaign and the top events in the tree are
the six main tasks described earlier. The up branches of the tree represent the
success of each top event while the down branches are the failure. The last column
is the end state of the tree which provides information about the combination of
failure/success events that leads to a misloaded cask (or not). This event tree has
a similar structure as reported in Ref. [8] except that the second top event here
was modeled using two separate top events in the EPRI model[8]. The fault tree
methodology was used to model the top events that are composed of multiple sub-
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tasks. These fault trees add additional details to the analysis by breaking it down
to the subtask level.
Figures (3.3 - 3.5) show the fault tree for the first, second, and fourth top events,
respectively. The basic events in the fault trees are the failure probability of the
subtasks which are obtained using SPAR-H. In the first task, any error in one of
the two subtasks 1.1 and 1.2 may lead to error in creating the FLP form unless it
is caught in the verification step (1.3). For the second task, the failure the task of
assigning the FAs location in the cask leads to an error in creating the FMSDS if
the subsequent two verification steps do not catch the error. The fourth task is the
three-way communication to verify the location of the assembly in the cask. The
failure of this task occurs only if all the three verification steps fail to find the error.
The top events and the basic event failure probabilities are obtained using SPAR-
H except for the third top event. The failure probability of the third event was
previously calculated and reported in Ref. [5] based on some historical data. The
calculation was repeated in Ref. [6] and a beta distribution was obtained for the
probability of error in the process of loading the fuel assemblies inside the cask. The
calculation is repeated in Appendix B. The mean error probability of transferring
the assembly from the SFP to the cask is 2.73× 10−4/assembly transfer. Thus, the
probability of having at least one error when transferring (N) assemblies will be
P (N) = [1− (1− 2.73× 10−4)N ], where N = 32 for PWR and 68 for BWR.
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Figure 3.2: The event tree of the cask loading process
3.3 SAPHIRE Software
Using the modeled event tree and the associated fault trees, the misloading prob-
ability is found by using the Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated
Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) version 8.0.9 software[39]. This software was
developed by the U.S. NRC to perform probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) for
applications primarily in the nuclear industry. The software can be used to quan-
tify the event trees, perform sensitivity analysis, and estimate the uncertainty using
Monte Carlo sampling or Latin Hypercube sampling. The inputs to this code are
the event trees, fault trees, and the probability distribution functions (PDFs) for
each event. The outputs are the probability of each end state plus the uncertainty.
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Figure 3.3: The fault tree of the first task
Figure 3.4: The fault tree of the second task
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SPAR-H is used in this study for several reasons. First, compared to the first-
generation methods, SPAR-H is more flexible in terms of the level of task analysis
and less restrictive as to what types of tasks the HEP values are applicable. SPAR-
H can be applied to the task level or subtask level. The level of details provided
for each human task in the literature makes SPAR-H is best option to be used.
Meanwhile, as compared to the other second-generation methods, the quantification
process of SPAR-H is well defined in the publicly available regulatory document
[17] and less complicated. Second, the beta distribution is used in SPAR-H instead
of lognormal distribution. From the viewpoint of characterization of uncertainty
associated with HEPs in HRA, the Beta distribution is better from two aspects, as
compared to the lognormal distribution. First, by changing the shape parameter,
the shape of the Beta distribution can be changed flexibly (rather than assuming a
bell-shaped density function with a long right tail, as in the lognormal distribution).
Second, the Beta distribution ranges between 0 and 1, which is consistent with the
theoretical range of the probability.
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The assigned PSFs for all of the human tasks are shown in Table 4.1. The
description of each PSF and the reasons for PSF level selection is as follow:
• ”Available Time” refers to the time required by the crew to diagnose and
perform the task. If the available time to perform any task is inadequate, the
probability of failure is likely to be high since the operator will not have time
to perform the task. Nominal value is assigned for all tasks because there is
no time limit to do the tasks.
• ”Stress level” refers to the negative as well as positive motivating forces that
affect the human performance. Stress in the NPP personnel can include men-
tal stress, excessive workload, and environmental factors. An example of
environmental factors is noise, radiation level, heat,and poor ventilation. The
stress multiplier in all of the tasks was assumed to 1.0 because there is no
information available about the stresses that could affect the failure probabil-
ities.
• ”Complexity” is defined as the level of difficulty in performing a task in a
given context. The effect of cask capacity was added to the complexity PSF.
It was assumed that the task complexity linearly depends on the number
of fuel assemblies (N) that will be loaded into the cask since each task will
be repeated N times. Adjusting the complexity level by multiplying it by
N is equivalent to consider a group of subtasks repeated for multiple fuel
assemblies performed in series. Multiplying the complexity level by N will
result in multiplying the failure probability of the task by N , which is the same
as multiplying the failure probability of single subtask by N . Since there are
N opportunities to make an error, the likelihood of making an error is N
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times the probability for single subtask. Therefore, the PSF multiplication of
the complexity is a linear function of N . The complexity level for all of the
diagnosis tasks was assumed to be obvious since it is for one assembly only. It
was then multiplied by N to take into account the N assemblies to be loaded.
In addition, in this research, the number of fuel assemblies is assumed to be
the only dominant contributing factor to the Complexity PSF. Other factors
such as rule-based and knowledge-based decision-making, level of ambiguity,
and the amount of remote communication are assumed to have smaller effects
on the complexity level compared to the number of fuel assemblies.
• ”Experience and Training”. It refers to the level of experience of the crew(s)
involved in a task. For the first task of creating the FLP form, the refueling
engineer is assumed high experience and training level. The refueling engineer
should be well-trained to be able to do this task. For the other tasks, the
nominal value is assumed because of the lack of available information.
• ”Procedures” refers to the available formal procedures for the task. The first
subtask of selecting the fuel assemblies that conform with CoC, the refueling
engineer follows standard procedure to select the assemblies. Therefore, the
level of ”Diagnostic/symptom oriented” is assigned to Task 1.1. Also, the
same level is assigned for the fourth task (three-way communication) because
the operators follow standard procedure to verify the loaded fuel assemblies.
However, for the rest of the tasks, nominal level is assigned to the procedure
PSF.
• ”Ergonomics and HMI” refers to the quantity and quality of information avail-
able from instrumentation, and the human-machine interaction. This PSF is
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assumed to be good for the first and second tasks because these tasks are
done in the office environment where all the needed information is organized
in a database that can be accessed easily. Similarly, the last verification prior
shipment has a good HMI PSF for the same reasons.
• ”Fitness for Duty” refers to whether the crew is physically and mentally fit
to do the task at this time. This PSF is assumed to be nominal for all hu-
man tasks because this research focuses on an assessment of the cask misload
risk under the generic or average conditions. If the analysis is conducted
for a specific plant, this PSF should be updated based on the plant-specific
conditions.
• ”Work Processes” refers to aspects of doing work such as work planning,
communication, and management policies. Nominal value is assumed for all
tasks for the same as the previous reason.
The final HEP for each human task was calculated using the SPAR-H worksheet.
Appendix C shows an example of a filled worksheet for the basic event 1.1 (Task
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.2 shows the values of HEPD, HEPA, dependency level, and the final
human error probability calculated using SPAR-H for each task for both reactor
types.The dependency levels are assigned based on dependency condition table
provided in SPAR-H worksheet as shown in appendix A. The dependency level for
the task of reviewing the FLP (task 1.3) is assumed to be low dependency. The
reason is that this task is carried out by the fuel handling engineer (different crew)
at the same location, where the refueling engineer creates the FLPF. The task
of printing the FMSDS and reviewing it (task 2.2) has high dependency because
it is performed by the same crew member who creates the FMSDS, at the same
location with no additional cues. For the fourth task, the first task of the three-way
communication is assumed to have low dependency because the it is performed by
the same crew who performs the previous task. The second and third verification of
the same task are assumed to have medium dependency because they are performed
at the same location, close in time, and with no additional cues. Zero dependency
is assigned for task 3 for several reasons. First, this task is performed in a location
different than where the FMSDS and FLP form are created. Second, more than four
crew members are responsible of performing this task (refueling engineer, nuclear
oversight inspector, and two other workers). Third, this this task is performed in
one day or more after creating the FMSDS and FLP form. Therefore, according to
SPAR-H dependency table, the task has zero dependency with the previous tasks.
The final human error probabilities for the BWR fuel loading are greater than
for the PWR fuel, as expected. The primary reason is that the number of fuel as-
semblies to be loaded in a cask is greater for BWR fuel which increases the failure
probability since the task will be repeated more often. Another factor that also
increases the human error probabilities for BWR is the complexity level. The mul-
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tiplier for the complexity PSF is greater for BWR than PWR. A beta distribution
is used in SPAR-H to get PDFs for all of the tasks. The parameters of the beta
distribution are shown in Table 4.3 for all of the human tasks. These parameters
were obtained from the SPAR-H worksheet except for the third task, which was
obtained from Ref. [6]. The alpha (α) parameter of beta distribution as a function
of mean HEP is directly obtained from Fig. 4.1 [17]. Then α and mean HEP (µ)





A Matlab code was used to accurately interpolate between the data points to obtain
an accurate value for the parameters of the beta distribution for each task. The























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.2 Misload Probability Results
The event tree model and the associated fault trees with the corresponding PDFs
for each task were used to build a model in the SAPHIRE software. The probability
of misloading a cask with at least one fuel assembly is then calculated by quantifying
the event tree. This done by adding the probabilities of the end states 5, 9, and 11
in the event tree. The probability of the three end states and the total probability
of having a misloaded cask for PWR and BWR fuel loading are shown in Table 4.4.
The contribution of the end state 11 in the total probability is the highest. Even
though the number of assemblies stored in the BWR casks is almost twice as many
as in PWR casks, the probability of misloading a cask with BWR fuel is 5 times
higher than that for cask loaded with PWR fuel. The reason will be explained later.
Table 4.4: Misload Probability
End State
PWR BWR
5% Mean 95% 5% Mean 95%
5 3.20E-15 2.48E-08 6.50E-08 9.10E-14 6.56E-07 2.10E-06
9 0.00E+00 2.33E-09 1.70E-09 1.10E-16 1.32E-07 1.30E-07
11 3.90E-10 5.57E-06 2.50E-05 2.10E-09 2.87E-05 1.30E-04
Total 6.30E-10 5.56E-06 2.60E-05 4.80E-09 2.95E-05 1.30E-04
The total number of the PWR and BWR spent fuel assemblies are 104,000 and
138,000 respectively which correspond to 3,250 of PWR casks and 2,030 of BWR
casks. If all the casks are loaded, the expected number of a misloaded cask can
be found by multiplying the total number of casks with the misload probability.
Therefore, the expected number of misloaded casks is 1.81E-3 for the PWR fuel
and 5.99E-2 for the BWR fuel. These numbers are obtained by assuming the cask
47
misloading events are independent, all the BWR and PWR planets have the same
working conditions, the same loading procedures are followed in all planets, and
the regulations will be the same over time. These numbers also show that the risk
of having a misloaded cask for the BWR fuel is as important as the PWR fuel.
Therefore, more attention and research need to be performed for the BWR fuel
casks. Figure 4.2 shows the effect of the number of the loaded assemblies on the
misload probabilities. The relation between the cask capacity and the probability
of the misload is not linear. The following equation is found to be the best fit for
the misload probability and the number of loaded assemblies
P (N) = 4.022× 10−9 ×N2.101 (4.2)
Equation 4.2 shows the relation between the probability of misload and the number
of assemblies is near quadratic relation. This relation indicates that loading a higher
number of fuel assemblies into a cask will result in increasingly higher probability
of misload.In order to get a low probability of misload, it is better to have a smaller
cask. In other words, loading the same number of spent fuel assemblies in multiple
casks at different loading campaigns has a lower probability of misload than loading
them into one cask.
The uncertainty intervals and the mean probability value as a function of the
number of fuel assemblies are shown in Fig. 4.3. The y-axis is plotted in logarithmic
scale. The upper uncertainty curve (95%) is closer to the mean than the lower
uncertainty curve (5%). The lower curve has very low values compared to the upper
and mean values. Therefore, the lower uncertainty can be considered negligible and
approximated to zero. The upper uncertainty level is approximately twice as high
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Figure 4.2: The effect of the cask capacity on the probability of misload
as than the mean values.
The probability of misload for PWR fuel is 5.56E-6 which has the same order
of magnitude as the value reported in previous literature [8], which is 2.60E-6.
Although a slightly different event tree and different HRA methods were used, the
final probability of cask misload for PWR fuel using SPAR-H and THERP from
literature was very close. The reason is that SPAR-H method is derived from
THERP method, where both share the same dependency levels most of the PSFs.
Thus, it is expected to obtain similar results when using both methods.
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Figure 4.3: The uncertainty of probability as a function of N
4.3 Importance Measures
Importance measure is a very important step in PRA to find the contribution of each
basic event to the risk. In this thesis, the Fussell-Vesely (FV) importance measures
were used to rank the contribution of the basic event in the final probability of
misload [40]. The FV importance measures were calculated using the SAPHIRE
software to determine the importance of each task. The FV importance measures










where R(i) is the sum of the risk from all the cut sets containing the event i,
R(base) is the total risk, and R(xi = 0) is the risk calculated when the event i
is assumed to have a zero failure rate. Table 4.5 shows the FV importance data
for all of the human tasks for the PWR and BWR fuel. The most important task
is the verification prior to shipment, the last task. This task contributes to all
of the misload end states of the event tree. Reducing the error in this task will
decrease the misloading probability significantly. Also, the three subtasks of the
first main task have high importance and a high impact on the misload probability.
Therefore, a more detailed analysis needs to be carried out for the first and sixth
tasks to reduce the misloading probability.
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
Due to the lack of a detailed description of the human tasks of the cask loading
process, some of PSFs were assumed to have nominal values. In this section, the
effect of each of the PSFs on the final probability is studied. The misload probability
is calculated for different scenarios. The aim of this section is to calculate the
misload probability for different working conditions and circumstances.
4.4.1 Pressure due to Time Constraint
Time available to do the task is one of the most important PSFs that affect
directly the failure probability. If the available time to perform any task is inade-
quate, the probability of failure is likely to be high since the operator will not have
time to perform the task. Figure 4.5 shows the effect of the available time on the
final probability of misload for both PWR and BWR fuel. The x-axis is the time
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Probability FV Prob. FV
Task
1.1
8.50E-03 3.24E-01 4.00E-03 3.32E-01
Task
1.2
1.70E-02 6.49E-01 8.00E-03 6.64E-01
Task
1.3
6.62E-02 9.73E-01 5.76E-02 9.95E-01
Task
2.1
1.02E-01 4.53E-03 4.80E-02 3.94E-04
Task
2.2
5.34E-01 4.53E-03 5.16E-01 3.94E-04
Task
2.3
6.80E-02 4.53E-03 3.20E-02 3.94E-04
Task
3
1.86E-02 2.27E-02 8.74E-03 4.34E-03
Task
4.1
2.44E-01 2.72E-02 1.41E-01 4.74E-03
Task
4.2
3.18E-01 2.72E-02 2.25E-01 4.74E-03
Task
4.3
2.01E-01 2.72E-02 1.70E-01 4.74E-03
Task
5
1.36E-01 2.72E-02 6.40E-02 4.74E-03
Task
6
1.70E-02 1.00E+00 8.00E-03 1.00E+00
multiplier that is used in the SPAR-H worksheet. The time multiplier is the factor
that is multiplied with the nominal human error probability to find the modified
error probability under certain time constraints. In the base case (Table 4.4), the
time multiplier was assumed to be 1 since no information is available about it. The
definition of each PSF is provided in Fig. 4.4 [33]. The nominal value of time is
assumed if the available time to perform the task is greater by a small amount
than the time required to perform it. If the time available is much greater than
52
the required time, the time is assumed expansive time. However, if there is no time
margin, the time is assumed to be barely adequate.
In this sensitivity analysis, the effect of the available time on the final probability
of misload is found. The time constraint is assumed to exist in the last three
verification steps only. The reason for not choosing the first three tasks is that the
first two tasks are performed in an office environment with no time pressure and
the cask loading process starts after completing them. For the task of moving the
fuel assemblies from the pool to the cask (third task), the standard fuel movement
procedure makes sure that it is performed slower than the required time. However,
the verification steps may be performed faster to expedite the loading process in
order to reach a scheduled milestone on time. In Fig. 4.5, the available time PSF of
the last three tasks was multiplied with the same multiplier. In the case of barely
adequate time, where there is no time margin, the probabilities of misload are 3.63E-
4 and 8.07E-3 for PWR and BWR, respectively. In this case, the probability is high
for both reactor types, especially for BWR, compared to the nominal time case.
Therefore, having a small time margin over the required time in the verification
tasks reduces the probability of misload significantly.
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Figure 4.5: Available time effect on the misload probability
55
4.4.2 Stress Level
Stress can also affect the human performance negatively and positively. Stress
in the NPP personnel can include mental stress, excessive workload, and environ-
mental factors. An example of environmental factors is noise, radiation level, heat,
and poor ventilation. The effect of the stress level for both reactor types is shown
in Figure 4.6. The effect of stress level is very significant on the probability of
misload as shown in Figure 4.6, where the misload probability reaches 2.68-4 and
6.74E-3 for PWR and BWR fuel respectively. However, because of the most tasks





Figure 4.6: Stress level effect on the misload probability
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4.4.3 Verification Prior to Shipment
The probability of misload was found without including the last top event in the
event tree which is the verification prior the shipment. Since the spent fuel casks
will be stored in the reactor building for a long time before shipment, it is impor-
tant to calculate the probability of misload without including the last verification
step. Also, it is not clear that if this step is performed in all reactor sites or not.
Therefore, the probability of misload was calculated without the last verification
step. Table 4.6 shows the probability of misload in both reactor types with their
uncertainties and a comparison with studied done by NRC[6] without including the
last verification process. The mean probability of misload increased significantly
without the last verification step. The reason is that this basic event has the highest
FV values. Comparing the probability of misload obtained in this study with the
previous study by NRC, a good agreement between the mean and the upper uncer-
tainty bound. The lower bounds in both studies have very small values compared
to the mean. The difference comes from using different HRA methods and differ-
ent distribution functions. In the NRC study, the THERP method and lognormal
distribution were used.
Table 4.6: Probability of misload without last verification
PWR PWR [6] BWR
Mean 7.04E-04 7.24E-04 1.82E-03
5% 1.83E-06 3.30E-05 6.46E-06




In the previous chapter, the analysis focused on quantifying the risk of having a
fuel cask with at least one misloaded fuel assembly. However, neutronic criticality
analysis of the casks suggests that, due to conservative loading plan, the cask needs
to be misloaded with more than one fuel assemblies to become susceptible to crit-
icality [8]. All the previous studies focused on quantifying the risk of misloading
the cask with at least one fuel assemblies. in the study by NRC [6], the multi-
ple misloads probability is calculated by assuming the misload events independent.
According to Bevard et al. [9], this assumption is not valid and the dependency
between the misload events and the human actions need to be consider. In this
chapter, an event tree will be constructed to calculate the probability of misloading
a cask with more than one fuel assemblies.
5.1 Multiple Misloads
The number of multiple misloads scenarios is very large compared to the single
misload scenarios. This is because of the different combination of errors that could
lead to multiple misloads. For example, making two mistakes in one of the tasks will
lead to misload at least two assemblies in the cask. Also, making one mistake in one
event and another independent mistake in another event will lead also to misload
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the cask with at least two fuel assemblies. In the single misload analysis, the number
of misloaded assemblies was not important because we were interested in finding the
probability of misloading at least one fuel assembly. Any error during the loading
process was assumed to lead to a misloaded cask despite the number of misloaded
assemblies. In multiple misloads analysis, we need to identify the scenarios that lead
to a cask with at least k number of misloaded fuel assemblies. This increases the
number of possible scenarios and makes the analysis more challenging even when
using the event tree analysis.
We have limited our analysis to determining the probability of having a cask
with at least two misloaded fuel assemblies. In this chapter an event tree will be
constructed to find all possible multiple misloads scenarios.
5.2 Multiple Misloads Event Tree
Using the event tree, all the scenarios that could lead to multiple misloads can be
identified and the probability of all scenarios can then be calculated. In this event
tree, more than two branches will be used. For some events, there will be three
branches in the tree. The upper branch is when the task is executed successfully.
The middle branch is when there is one error in that task, and the last branch is
when there are at least two errors. This is necessary to simulate all possible com-
binations of human errors in one tree. The reason for using three branches is that
the multiple misloads can occur as a result of having more than one independent
errors during the loading process. For instance, two independent errors during the
process of preparation of the FLPF or FMSDS can lead to more than one misloads.
Also, having a single error in the FLPF and another independent error during the
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process of transferring the assemblies from the pool to the cask can lead to two
misloads.
Figure 5.1 shows the event tree of the multiple misloads scenarios. The top events
of the tree are the same as the top events of the single misload event tree. The
main difference is having three branches in the first three events, which leads to
additional sequences. There are six sequences that lead to multiple misloads in the
tree. The description of each sequence is shown in Table 5.1. The ”OK” endstates
are the sequences that lead to single misload or no misloads. The final probability
of multiple misloads will be the summation of the six ”Multiple” endstates. For
the top events 1, 2, and 4, the same fault trees were used to find the probability of






































The main issue in this method is how to calculate the multiple error probability
of the repeated tasks. Since the same task is performed by the same crew, it is
not accurate to assume the tasks independent. To solve this issue, a separate event
tree is constructed for each repeated task where the top events in the tree represent
the same repeated task. The total number of top events in each tree will be the
same as the number of fuel assemblies to be loaded into the cask (N). The total
number of potential scenarios resulted from this tree is (2N). The dependency can
be taken into account by applying the dependency rules of SPAR-H for all the tasks
following the first error in each scenario. For instance, if the first error occurs in the
second FA, the probability of the success and failure of all subsequent events need
to be updated based on SPAR-H dependency equations. Fig. 5.2 shows a simple
example of a FA-based event tree where the task is repeated four time. The total
number of scenarios are 16. To find the probability of each scenario, let p is the
probability of the error of the task and p′ is the probability of error updated based
on dependency levels of SPAR-H. The probability of S6 and S11, for example, can
be calculated as
P (S6) = (1− p)p(1− p′)p′
P (S11) = (p)(1− p′)2p′
The probability of performing the task N times successfully, P (0), can be calculated
directly from the tree as
P (0) = (1− p)N (5.1)
Also, the probability of making exactly one error, making at least one error, and
making multiple errors can be found directly from the tree. To find the probability
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Table 5.1: Multiple misloads event tree sequences
Sequence Description
#6 In this sequence, the refueling engineer creates the FLPF without
any error. The FMSDS for all fuel assemblies are also created with
no errors. However, during the loading process, two independent
errors are made. The error could be in choosing incorrect fuel
assembly from the pool or loading the correct fuel assembly into
an incorrect location in the cask. All the subsequent verification
steps are unable to catch the two errors. The cask is shipped with
at least two misloaded assemblies.
#11 The refueling engineer creates the FLPF with no errors. One error
is made in creating the FMSDS, and at least another error is made
during the loading process. All the subsequent verification steps
are unable to catch the two errors. The cask is shipped with at
least two misloaded assemblies.
#15 In this sequence, the refueling engineer creates the FLPF without
any error. However, at least two errors are made in creating the
FMSDS. The cask is loaded correctly with fuel assemblies based
on the incorrect FMSDS. The cask is misloaded with at least two
fuel assemblies. All three subsequent verification steps are unable
to catch the two errors. The cask is shipped with at least two
misloaded assemblies.
#20 The refueling engineer makes an error while creating the FLPF. The
FMSDSs are created successfully based on the information from
FLPF. At least another error is made during the loading process so
the cask is misloaded with two fuel assemblies. The two subsequent
verification steps fail to identify the error made in the loading pro-
cess, and the last verification step fails to catch the two errors. The
cask is shipped with least two misloaded assemblies.
#24 The refueling engineer makes an error while creating the FLPF.
At least another error is made in creating the FMSDS. The load-
ing process is done correctly but with at least two incorrect fuel
assemblies due to errors in the previous two steps. The two subse-
quent verification steps fail to identify the error made in creating
the FMSDS, and the last verification step fails to catch the two
errors. The cask is shipped with least two misloaded assemblies.
#26 In this sequence, at least two errors are made while creating the
FLPF. All the subsequent events are done correctly except the last
verification is unable to catch the two errors made in the FLPF.
The cask is shipped with least two misloaded assemblies.
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of making at least one error P (k ≥ 1), all the scenarios except the success in all
tasks need to be summed. This can be done by subtracting probability of success
(P (0)) from 1.0. The probability of having exactly one error, P (1), can be found
by calculating the summation of the probability of all scenarios that have only one
failure. For N FAs case, the number of scenarios of exactly one error is N scenarios.




(1− p)i−1p(1− p′)N−i (5.2)
The multiple error probability can be found by subtracting the probability of doing
the task N times successfully or having exactly one error from 1 as
P (k ≥ 2) = 1− (P (1) + P (0)) (5.3)
Figure 5.2: The event tree for 4-times repeated task
The human error probabilities for each task are calculated using SPAR-H HRA
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Table 5.2: Probability of failure in performing each task once













by assuming that the task will be performed once. The only difference between
this calculation and the previous one is that the complexity level does not depend
on the number of loaded fuel assemblies. The reason is that the calculation of the
probabilities is based on performing a task once, not N times. Table 5.2 shows the
failure probability of doing a task once. The probabilities in Table 5.2 are the same
for both reactor types since they represent the failure probability of a task as a
standalone act.
FA-based event trees are constructed for all tasks for PWR and BWR fuels. The
number of the top events is N = 32 for PWR, and N = 68 for BWR. The values
in Table 5.2 are used in the FA-based trees to obtain the probability of having at
least one failure, at least two failures, and exactly one failure in each task. The
dependency level between the repeated tasks is assigned based on the SPAR-H
dependency level. Most of the tasks are performed by the same crew and close
in time except the third task. Therefore, a high dependency level is assigned for
all tasks except for the third task. In the third task, different crew members may
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Table 5.3: Failure probability for each task for PWR fuel cask
Task Dependency P (k > 1) P (k ≥ 2) P (1)
Task 1.1 HD 3.99E-03 3.74E-03 2.48E-04
Task 1.2 HD 7.88E-03 7.39E-03 4.87E-04
Task 1.3 HD 7.97E-03 7.48E-03 4.92E-04
Task 1 9.41E-05 8.85E-05 5.81E-06
Task 2.1 HD 4.48E-02 4.21E-02 2.62E-03
Task 2.2 HD 6.96E-01 6.88E-01 8.15E-03
Task 2.3 HD 3.05E-02 2.87E-02 1.82E-03
Task 2 9.50E-04 8.94E-04 5.56E-05
Task 3 LD 8.70E-03 4.33E-03 4.37E-03
Task 4.1 HD 4.48E-02 4.22E-02 2.62E-03
Task 4.2 HD 5.26E-01 5.14E-01 1.15E-02
Task 4.3 HD 5.21E-01 5.10E-01 1.15E-02
Task 4 HD 1.22E-02 1.15E-02 7.15E-04
Task 5 HD 5.91E-02 5.57E-02 3.38E-03
Task 6 HD 7.96E-03 7.47E-03 4.92E-04
move the assemblies from the spent fuel pool to the cask based on the working
shift. Also, this process needs more than one day to be completed. Therefore, a
low dependency is used for the third task. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show the probability of
having at least one, at least two errors, and exactly one error as well as the assigned
dependency level of the repeated tasks for PWR and BWR fuels respectively. The
probability of failure of tasks 1, 2, and 4 are calculated using the fault trees from the
subtasks failure as in the previous chapter. The probabilities of failure of all tasks
are greater for the BWR fuel compared to the PWR due to the larger cask capacity.
As expected, the probability of having at least two errors is slightly smaller than
the probability of having at least one error in the cases of high dependent tasks.
The values in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 were plugged in the event tree to find the final
multiple misloads probabilities.
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Table 5.4: Failure probability for each task for BWR fuel cask
Task Dependency P (k > 1) P (k ≥ 2) P (1)
Task 1.1 HD 8.42E-03 8.17E-03 2.45E-04
Task 1.2 HD 1.66E-02 1.61E-02 4.76E-04
Task 1.3 HD 1.66E-02 1.61E-02 4.76E-04
Task 1 4.12E-04 4.02E-04 1.18E-05
Task 2.1 HD 8.95E-02 8.72E-02 2.29E-03
Task 2.2 HD 7.83E-01 7.80E-01 2.83E-03
Task 2.3 HD 6.13E-02 5.96E-02 1.64E-03
Task 2 4.24E-03 4.13E-03 1.09E-04
Task 3 LD 1.84E-02 1.32E-02 5.20E-03
Task 4.1 HD 8.90E-02 8.67E-02 2.28E-03
Task 4.2 HD 6.49E-01 6.44E-01 4.45E-03
Task 4.3 HD 6.48E-01 6.43E-01 4.46E-03
Task 4 HD 3.76E-02 3.66E-02 9.64E-04
Task 5 HD 1.14E-01 1.11E-01 2.80E-03
Task 6 HD 1.66E-02 1.61E-02 4.76E-04
Table 5.5 shows the final multiple misloads probabilities of the six sequences and
the total multiple misloads probability for PWR fuel with the associated uncertainty
level. The total probability is the summation of the six misload sequences. The
probability of multiple misloads in PWR using this method is found to be 6.73E-07.
Probability of multiple misloads and associated uncertainty for the BWR fuel are
shown in Table 5.6. The mean probability of misload in BWR fuel cask is 7.55E-06.
Table 5.5: Probability of multiple misloads for PWR fuel cask
Sequence 5% Mean 95%
#6 2.26E-14 2.05E-08 7.43E-08
#11 1.91E-20 2.14E-12 3.13E-12
#15 3.36E-17 3.98E-09 5.66E-09
#20 1.37E-20 2.32E-13 4.45E-13
#24 1.31E-23 2.59E-14 1.34E-14
#26 5.31E-11 6.48E-07 2.95E-06
Total 1.37E-10 6.73E-07 3.03E-06
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Table 5.6: Probability of multiple misloads for BWR fuel cask
Sequence 5% Mean 95%
#6 2.01E-12 8.49E-07 3.46E-06
#11 2.95E-18 1.38E-10 2.46E-10
#15 5.45E-15 2.86E-07 4.84E-07
#20 1.76E-18 1.42E-11 3.10E-11
#24 4.22E-21 4.86E-12 2.46E-12
#26 5.41E-10 6.41E-06 2.92E-05
Total 2.41E-09 7.55E-06 3.41E-05
The multiple misloads probability of BWR fuel is approximately 10 times larger
than the PWR fuel cask. Comparing the probability of having at least one misload
and two misloads, the probability of having at least one misload is 8 time larger
larger for PWR fuel cask and 4 times larger for BWR fuel cask. Figure 5.3 shows the
relation between the mean multiple misloads probability and the cask capacity. The
probability reaches a value of 2.53E-05 for the cask of a capacity of 98 assemblies.
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Figure 5.3: The probability of misloading more than one fuel assemblies as a func-




In the first part of this study, the risk of misloading a cask with at least one
fuel assembly in PWR and BWR was quantified using the event tree method. An
event tree for the loading procedure was developed. Fault trees were used to add
additional details to the model and to describe the complicated human tasks. The
developed event tree and the associated fault trees were built based on the model
by Dykes and Machiels [8]. The loading procedure was assumed to be the same
for both reactor types fuel assemblies. The only difference in this analysis was the
capacity of the casks. The capacity of the cask was 32 for PWR and 68 for BWR.
SPAR-H HRA method was used to estimate the human error probabilities for
all the human tasks except the movement of fuel assemblies from the spent fuel to
the cask. The probability distribution function for that task was calculated based
on some historical events. The PSFs were assigned by the author based on the
available information in the literature and an interview conducted with an expert
in the field. A beta distribution was used for all of the human errors to perform the
uncertainty quantification. The parameters of the beta distribution were found for
all the HEPs. The event tree, fault trees, and the PDFs were used as an input to
the SAPHIRE software to find the final probability of misload. The probability of
having a cask with one or more misloaded fuel assemblies was found to be 5.56E-
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6/cask for the PWR and 2.95E-5/cask for the BWR fuel. Good agreement was
found between the probability estimated in this work and those reported in the
literature for PWR. The probability of misload for the BWR fuel was found to be
higher than that for the PWR fuel. The reason is that the BWR cask capacity is
greater than the PWR.
The cask capacity effect on the final probability of misload was studied. The
misload probability was found to be proportional to the square of the capacity of
the cask. This relation suggests that dividing the fuel assemblies into multiple casks
will result in lower probability than loading them into one cask. This explains why
the probability of misload in BWR is 5 times more than PWR even though the
BWR casks can store 2 times the PWR casks. Also, the effects of the available
time for each task and the stress level on the final probabilities were studied. If
the last three verification steps are performed faster than the required time, the
probability of misload increases significantly. The probability approaches 3.63E-
4/cask for PWR and 8.07E-3/cask for BWR. The effect of stress level on the final
probability is also significant but it is less than the effect of available time. In
addition to that, the probability of misload was also calculated without the final
verification process. A good agreement was also found between the current value
and the values reported in the literature.
The uncertainty in the final probability of misload was quantified. Also, The FV
importance measure was performed to determine the impact of each task on the
final probability. The first task (fuel loading pattern planning) and the last task
(verification prior shipment) were found to have the most significant impact on the
misload probability.
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In the second part of this study, an event tree was constructed to predict all the
multiple misloads scenarios. Six scenarios for multiple misloads were identified from
the tree. There were three branches for the first three events where the extra branch
was for multiple errors event. SPAR-H was also used to calculate the human error
probabilities. The failure of the human actions that are carried out repeatedly for all
fuel assemblies was assumed to be independent. The probability of having multiple
errors in each task was calculated using Binomial distribution. The dependencies
between the human actions were considered in the event tree using the standard
SPAR-H dependency levels. The same fault trees that were used in the single
misload analysis were used in the multiple misloads analysis. The probabilities of
having multiple errors for all tasks were calculated using the Binomial distribution
and were used in the event tree and the associated fault trees. The probabilities of
the six multiple misloads scenarios and the total multiple misloads were calculated
with the associated uncertainty. The probability of multiple misloads was found
to be 6.73E-07 for PWR fuel cask and 7.55E-06 for BWR fuel cask. Finally, the
probability of multiple misloads was calculated as a function of the cask capacity.
6.1 Future Work
For future work, a more detailed analysis needs to be carried out for the task of
preparing the FLPF (first task) and the verification prior to shipment task (last
task) to increase the accuracy of the calculations. These two tasks have the most
impact on the probability of misload. Also, other human reliability analysis meth-
ods can be used to estimate the HEPs for the same problem such as CREAM,
ATHEANA, and NARA. Applying a method such as CREAM and ATHEANA will
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provide better qualitative results for the human errors. Furthermore, the impact
of the other PSFs needs to be studied. The other PSFs are plant-specific which
depend on the plant characteristics. This requires a visit to different NPPs in order
to have more data.
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Appendix A
SPAR-H worksheet for LP/SD
The following appendix shows the standard SPAR-H worksheet for low power/shutdown.







Probability Calculation of the
Third Task (Moving the
assemblies to the cask)
The Bayesian approach was used to estimate the probability of having an error in
the process of moving the fuel from the spent fuel pool to the cask location based





f(A|E): The posterior distribution given the evidence E.
f(E|A)
f(E)
: The relative likeilhood of E.
f(A): The prior distribution
The Binomial distribution is used to model the fuel transfer errors because it is the








where p is the probability of moving the wrong assembly, n is the total number of
assemblies that will be moved to the cask, and x is the number of errors during the
movement of the assemblies.
The Bayesian approach will be used to find the posterior distribution. The beta
distribution is the common distribution to be used with the binomial as the prior
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distribution because it will result in another beta distribution as a posterior. The
beta distribution can be written in the following form









The values of a = b = 0.5 were used for the prior distribution to reduce the impact of
the prior on the posterior. This special type of beta distributions is called Jeffreys’
non-informative prior distribution. Therefore, the PDF will become
f(p) ∝ [p(1− p)]−
1
2 (B.5)
By substitution of the likelihood function of the binomial and the prior distribution
in the Bayesian equation, the posterior will have the following form
f(p, x) =
p(x+0.5)−1(1− p)(t−x+0.5)−1
B(x+ 0.5, t− x+ 0.5)
= Beta(x+ 0.5, t− x+ 0.5) (B.6)
where t and x are the total number of the fuel assembly movements (1,199,000) and
the total number of historical fuel transfer errors (327). For more information, see







= 2.73× 10−4 (B.7)
this mean probability was used as the mean failure probability of the task of moving
the assemblies from the pool to the cask (third task).
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Appendix C
An example of a filled SPAR-H
worksheet
The following appendix shows the SPAR-H worksheet for the independent verification of the







Computational Method and Code
for UQ and Sensitivity Analysis
In this Appendix, the matlab code is provided and a short explanation of the
convergence study. To make sure that the final value of misload probability is
converged, a convergence study is carried out by using different number of random
samples. Fig. D.1 shows the risk as a function of the sample size. The risk is said
to be converged if its value is not affected with the sample size. It is clear that the
risk converges at sample size of 5.0E5. Therefore, a sample size of 1.0E6 is used to
estimate the probability of misload in all cases.
Figure D.1: The value of risk as a function of sample size
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1 c l c
2 c l e a r
3 % ========================== MS THESIS ====================================
4 % ============================== Spring 2018 ===================
5 % ====================== Created by Ibrahim Jarrah ========================
6
7 % +++++++++++ Var iab l e s and d i s t r i b u t i o n s +++++++++++
8 n=1000000; % number o f random samples .
9 R=zero s (n , 1 ) ; % Risk model ( the f i n a l p r obab i l i t y ) .
10 opt ion=1; % 1 : f o r i n s e r t i n g N in the complexity
11 % 2: f o r nominal complexity and mult ip ly
12 % each HEP by N.
13 N=1:5 :100 ; % Number o f Fuel a s s emb l i e s (32 PWR and 68 BWR)
14 M=zero s ( l ength (N) ,1) ;
15 upper=ze ro s ( l ength (N) ,1) ;
16 lower=ze ro s ( l ength (N) ,1) ;
17 % ======================= Sen s i t i v i t y ana l y s i s v a r i a b l e s ==================
18 mu l t i p l i e r = [1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 ] ;
19 % ============================ PSFs va r i a b l e s =============================
20 f o r k=1: l ength (N)
21 k
22 P1 1=ze ro s (3 , 1 ) ; % 1 : Fina l HEP 2 : a 3 : b
23 P1 2=ze ro s (3 , 1 ) ;
24 P1 3=ze ro s (3 , 1 ) ;
25 P2 1=ze ro s (3 , 1 ) ;
26 P2 2=ze ro s (3 , 1 ) ;
27 P2 3=ze ro s (3 , 1 ) ;
28 P4 1=ze ro s (3 , 1 ) ;
29 P4 2=ze ro s (3 , 1 ) ;
30 P4 3=ze ro s (3 , 1 ) ;
31 P5=ze ro s (3 , 1 ) ;
32 P6=ze ro s (3 , 1 ) ;
33 HEP=zero s (11 ,1 ) ;
34 f i l ename = s t r c a t ( ’PSFs . csv ’ ) ;
35 A = csvread ( f i l ename ) ;
36 f i l ename = s t r c a t ( ’ beta worksheet . csv ’ ) ;
37 worksheet = csvread ( f i l ename ) ;
38 % Dependency : ZD:1 LD:2 MD:3 HD:4 CD:5
39 % ====>>>>> Number o f ta sks =9;
40 % Update A based on the mu l t i p l i e r s
41 f o r i =1:8
42 A( : , i )=update A (A( : , i ) , mu l t i p l i e r ( i ) , i ) ;
43 end
44 i f ( opt ion == 1)
45 A( : , 3 )=update A (A( : , 3 ) ,N(k ) , i ) ;
46 end
47 f o r i =1:11
48 d i agno s i s=prod (A( i ∗2−1 ,1:8) ) ∗1E−2;
49 ac t i on=prod (A( i ∗2 , 1 : 8 ) ) ∗1E−3;
50 t o t a l=d i agno s i s+act i on ;
51 i f ( i ==7| i ==8| i==9) % This ta sks i s mu l t i p l i ed by two
52 t o t a l=t o t a l ∗2 ;
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53 end
54 switch A( i ∗2 ,9)
55 case 1
56 t o t a l=t o t a l ;
57 case 2
58 t o t a l =(1+19∗ t o t a l ) /20 ;
59 case 3
60 t o t a l =(1+6∗ t o t a l ) /7 ;
61 case 4
62
63 t o t a l=(1+t o t a l ) /2 ;
64 case 5
65 t o t a l =1;
66 otherwi se
67 disp ( ’WRONG DEPENDENCY INTRY ! ! ! ! ’ )
68 end
69 HEP( i )=t o t a l ;
70 end
71 P1 1=f i nd a b (HEP(1) , worksheet ) ;
72 P1 2=f i nd a b (HEP(2) , worksheet ) ;
73 P1 3=f i nd a b (HEP(3) , worksheet ) ;
74 P2 1=f i nd a b (HEP(4) , worksheet ) ;
75 P2 2=f i nd a b (HEP(5) , worksheet ) ;
76 P2 3=f i nd a b (HEP(6) , worksheet ) ;
77 P4 1=f i nd a b (HEP(7) , worksheet ) ;
78 P4 2=f i nd a b (HEP(8) , worksheet ) ;
79 P4 3=f i nd a b (HEP(9) , worksheet ) ;
80 P5=f i nd a b (HEP(10) , worksheet ) ;
81 P6=f i nd a b (HEP(11) , worksheet ) ;
82 P3=[0.000273∗N,327 . 5 , 1 1 99001 ] ;
83 % =========================================================================
84 f o r i =1:n
85 T1 1=betarnd ( P1 1 (2) , P1 1 (3) ) ;
86 T1 2=betarnd ( P1 2 (2) , P1 2 (3) ) ;
87 T1 3=betarnd ( P1 3 (2) , P1 3 (3) ) ;
88 T2 1=betarnd ( P2 1 (2) , P2 1 (3) ) ;
89 T2 2=betarnd ( P2 2 (2) , P2 2 (3) ) ;
90 T2 3=betarnd ( P2 3 (2) , P2 3 (3) ) ;
91 T3=betarnd (P3(2) ,P3 (3) ) ∗N(k) ;
92 T4 1=betarnd ( P4 1 (2) , P4 1 (3) ) ;
93 T4 2=betarnd ( P4 2 (2) , P4 2 (3) ) ;
94 T4 3=betarnd ( P4 3 (2) , P4 3 (3) ) ;
95 T5=betarnd (P5(2) ,P5 (3) ) ;
96 T6=betarnd (P6(2) ,P6 (3) ) ;
97 tmp1=((T1 1+T1 2 ) ∗T1 3 ) ;
98 tmp2=(T2 1∗T2 2∗T2 3 ) ;
99 tmp3=(T4 1∗T4 2∗T4 3 ) ;
100 s1=(1−tmp1)∗(1−tmp2) ∗tmp3∗T5∗T6∗T3 ;
101 s2=(1−tmp1) ∗( tmp2) ∗tmp3∗T5∗T6 ;
102 s3=(tmp1) ∗T6 ;
103 R( i )=s1+s2+s3 ;
104 end
90
105 M(k) = mean(R) ;
106 lower (k ) = quant i l e (R, 0 . 0 5 ) ;
107 upper (k )= quant i l e (R, 0 . 9 5 ) ;
108 end
109 %histogram ( log (R) ) ;
110 p lo t (N,M) ;
111 % This func t i on i s to update PSFs based on the mu l t i p l i e r s o f s e n s i t i v i t y
112 % ana l y s i s . . . .




117 f unc t i on z = f i nd a b (A, worksheet )
118 z=ze ro s (3 , 1 ) ;
119 z (1 )=A;
120 z (2 )=in te rp1 ( worksheet ( : , 1 ) , worksheet ( : , 2 ) ,A) ;
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